US Sound & Ser Inc v. Brick by unknown
1997 Decisions 
Opinions of the United 
States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit 
10-10-1997 
US Sound & Ser Inc v. Brick 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_1997 
Recommended Citation 
"US Sound & Ser Inc v. Brick" (1997). 1997 Decisions. 240. 
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_1997/240 
This decision is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for 
the Third Circuit at Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in 1997 Decisions by an authorized administrator of Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law 
Digital Repository. 
Filed October 10, 1997 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 




U.S. SOUND & SERVICE, INC., 




TOWNSHIP OF BRICK; PLANNING BOARD OF BRICK 
TOWNSHIP; GREGORY VOCATURO; PAMELA VOCATURO; 
RON LEVENDUSKY 
 
       U.S. Sound & Service, Inc., 
       and James Restaino, 
       Appellants 
 
On Appeal From the United States District Court 
For the District of New Jersey 
(D.C. Civil Action No. 96-cv-02353) 
 
Argued: August 14, 1997 
 
BEFORE: STAPLETON, GREENBERG and COWEN, 
Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion Filed October 10, 1997) 
 
       Lewis H. Robertson (Argued) 
       Evans, Osborne, Kreizman & Bonney 
       P.O. Box BB 
       Red Bank, NJ 07701 






       Shawn P. McCarthy (Argued) 
       Cucci & McCarthy 
       1500 Route 88 West 
       P.O. Box 1609 
       Brick, NJ 08723 
       Attorney for Appellee 
       Township of Brick 
 
       Robert D. Ford (Argued) 
       Russo, Secare, Ford, Delanoy & 
        Martino 
       616 Washington Street 
       Toms River, NJ 08753 
       Attorney for Appellee 
       Planning Board of Brick Township 
 
OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
STAPLETON, Circuit Judge: 
 
U.S. Sound & Service, Inc. ("U.S. Sound") asserts that the 
Township of Brick, New Jersey ("the Township"), and its 
Planning Board ("the Board") violated U.S. Sound's First 
Amendment right to free expression by imposing unjustified 
conditions on its right to operate a video store in the 
Township. The district court denied U.S. Sound's motion for 
a partial summary judgment as to liability, denied its 
alternative application for a preliminary injunction, and 
granted summary judgment for the Township and the 




In November 1995, U.S. Sound contracted to purchase 
property in Brick, New Jersey, which it planned to use as 
a video store offering "sales and rentals with video preview 
booths, books, magazines and sundries." App. at 273. The 
property is located within 600 feet of a structure that, since 
September 1996, has been used to house all of the 
kindergarten and most of the first grade classes in Brick, 
and it is also within 1500 feet of the Brick High School. An 
Ocean Ice Palace, which is frequented by young customers, 
 




stands across the street, and not far away is the only 
branch of the Ocean County Public Library in Brick. 
 
U.S. Sound intended to convert the property from its 
then current use as a hair salon; therefore, it had to apply 
to the Planning Board for a "change of use." Its application 
included a simple floor plan showing a 1000-square-foot 
single room with display racks and several booths for 
previewing movies available for rent. It described its 
projected video collection as including "rated and unrated 
titles in a broad range of categories such as drama, 
comedy, action, classical, documentary, musical, sports, 
nature and adult-theme videos in order to attract as broad 
a patronage as possible." App. at 88. 
 
The Board approved the change of use subject to the 
following conditions, among others that are not challenged 
before us: 
 
       There shall be no private viewing of movies within an 
       enclosed area anywhere upon the premises or within 
       the structure. Movies may, however, be previewed 
       without barriers, obstructions or privacy provided the 
       movies are not rated R, X, and NC and/or NC 17 or 
       any other rating other than G or PG. 
 
       . . . 
 
        In the event that the applicant chooses to sell books, 
       magazines, periodicals or other printed material or 
       photographs, films, motion pictures, video cassettes, 
       slides or other visual representations [described in New 
       Jersey's "Sexually Oriented Business Law" 1] then the 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. The law encompasses printed and recorded media that "depict or 
describe a `specified sexual activity' or `specified anatomical area.' " 
Specified sexual activity includes "(1) The fondling or other erotic 
touching of covered or uncovered human genitals, pubic region, buttock 
or female breasts; or (2) Any actual or simulated act of human 
masturbation, sexual intercourse or deviate sexual intercourse." 
Specified anatomical areas include "(1) Less than complete and opaquely 
covered human genitals, pubic region, buttock or female breasts below 
a point immediately above the top of the areola; or (2) Human male 
genitals in a discernibly turgid state even if covered." Chapter 230, Laws 
of 1995 (codified at N.J. Stat. Ann. 2C:34-6 (West Supp. 1997)). 
 




       sale of such materials can only take place in an area of 
       the premises that is separated, separately walled 
       through which admission can only be gained by a 
       separate door which shall have a sign affixed to it 
       stating that admission is only to those persons over 
       eighteen years of age. Such area shall not consume 
       more than ten percent of the square floor area of the 
       structure. 
 
App. at 228-29. 
 
Dissatisfied with these conditions, U.S. Sound filed suit 
in the district court against the Board and the Township 
under 42 U.S.C. S 1983 alleging that the Board's blanket 
prohibition of preview booths and its content-based 
restriction of adult-theme materials to 100 square feet 
inhibited U.S. Sound's free expression in violation of the 
First Amendment. 
 
After the Township and the Board answered, U.S. Sound 
moved for partial summary judgment and, in the 
alternative, for a preliminary injunction. In response, the 
Township and the Board moved for a summary judgment in 
their favor. In support of their own motion and in 
opposition to those of U.S. Sound, the Township and the 
Board advanced only one justification for the challenged 
conditions: the protection of minors from exposure to adult 
entertainment materials. U.S. Sound acknowledged that 
this was a "compelling state interest" for purposes of the 
strict scrutiny test and a "substantial state interest" for 
purposes of the intermediate scrutiny test. It insisted, 
however, that this legitimate interest of the Township and 
the Board did not justify the conditions imposed under 
either test. 
 
Relying on City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 
U.S. 41 (1986), the district court subjected the Township's 
regulation of U.S. Sound's proposed activities to 
intermediate scrutiny and held that it survived that 
scrutiny. Accordingly, it denied U.S. Sound's motions for 
partial summary judgment and a preliminary injunction 
and granted the motion of the Township and the Board. 
With no federal claims left pending before it, the court 
declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over several 
 




state claims asserted by U.S. Sound and dismissed those 
claims without prejudice. 
 
The district court properly exercised jurisdiction under 
28 U.S.C. S 1331, and this court has appellate jurisdiction 





"Speech, be it in the form of film, live presentations, or 
printed matter, that is sexually explicit in content but not 
`obscene' is protected under the First Amendment." Phillips 
v. Borough of Keyport, 107 F.3d 164, 172 (3d Cir. 1997). If 
the government regulates non-obscene expression based on 
its sexually explicit content, the restrictions imposed pass 
constitutional muster only if they survive "strict scrutiny"-- 
that is, only if they serve a compelling state interest in a 
manner which imposes the least possible burden on 
expression. Sable Communications, Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 
115, 126 (1989). On the other hand, if the government acts 
to ameliorate the undesirable "secondary effects" of sexually 
explicit expression, its regulation is regarded as "content- 
neutral" and enjoys a more deferential standard of 
"intermediate," rather than "strict," scrutiny. City of Renton 
v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41 (1986)(applying 
intermediate scrutiny to a zoning ordinance designed "to 
prevent crime, protect the city's retail trade, [and] maintain 
property values"); see also Ben Rich Trading, Inc. v. City of 
Vineland, 1997 WL 567320, at *5 (3d Cir. 1997); Phillips, 
107 F.3d at 172. Content-neutral governmental regulation 
survives this "intermediate scrutiny" if it is narrowly 
tailored to serve a substantial governmental interest and 
leaves open ample alternative channels for communication 
of the restricted expression. As we noted in Phillips, 
 
       [w]hile the requirement of narrow tailoring does not 
       mean that the ordinance must be the least restrictive 
       means of serving the Borough's substantial interests, 
       "[g]overnment may not regulate expression in such a 
       manner that a substantial portion of the burden on 
       speech does not serve to advance its goals." Ward v. 
       Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 799; 109 S. Ct. 
       2746, 2758, 105 L.Ed.2d 661 (1989). 
 




Id. at 174. 
 
The Township and the Board persuaded the district court 
that although the regulation imposed by the Board's 
resolution singles out adult entertainment for special 
treatment, it is content-neutral because it is aimed not at 
the sexually explicit content but rather at the "secondary 
effects" of that entertainment on children. Accordingly, the 
court applied the intermediate scrutiny test of Renton. 
Intermediate scrutiny was not appropriate, however, 
because "[l]isteners' reactions to speech are not the type of 
`secondary effects' . . . referred to in Renton." Boos v. Barry, 
485 U.S. 312, 321 (1988). As the Supreme Court explained 
in Boos: 
 
       To take an example factually close to Renton, if the 
       ordinance there was justified by the city's desire to 
       prevent the psychological damage it felt was associated 
       with viewing adult movies, then analysis of the 
       measure as a content-based statute would have been 
       appropriate. The hypothetical regulation targets the 
       direct impact of a particular category of speech, not a 
       secondary feature that happens to be associated with 
       that type of speech. 
 
Id. at 321. 
 
The impact of protected speech on minors is a direct, 
rather than a secondary, effect, and a regulation that 
singles out non-obscene sexually explicit material because 
of its impact on minors is not content-neutral. This is clear 
from the Supreme Court's recent decision in Reno v. 
American Civil Liberties Union, 117 S. Ct. 2329 (1997), 
where the Court struck down two provisions of the 
Communications Decency Act of 1996 (CDA). The Attorney 
General urged that the challenged provisions should be 
subjected to intermediate scrutiny under Renton because 
the Act was designed to protect minors from exposure to 
"indecent" and "patently offensive" speech on the Internet. 
The Court rejected this position: 
 
        In Renton, we upheld a zoning ordinance that kept 
       adult movie theatres out of residential neighborhoods. 
       The ordinance was aimed, not at the content of the 
       films shown in the theaters, but rather at the 
 




       "secondary effects"--such as crime and deteriorating 
       property values--that these theaters fostered:" `It is 
       th[e] secondary effect which these zoning ordinances 
       attempt to avoid, not the dissemination of "offensive" 
       speech.' " . . . [T]he purpose of the CDA is to protect 
       children from the primary effects of "indecent" and 
       "patently offensive" speech, rather than any 
       "secondary" effect of such speech. Thus, the CDA is a 
       content-based blanket restriction on speech, and, as 
       such, cannot be "properly analyzed as a form of time, 
       place, and manner regulation." 475 U.S., at 46, 106 S. 
       Ct. at 928. See also Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 321, 
       108 S. Ct. 1157, 1163, 99 L.Ed.2d 333 (1988) 
       ("Regulations that focus on the direct impact of speech 
       on its audience" are not properly analyzed under 
       Renton); Forsyth County v. Nationalist Movement, 505 
       U.S. 123, 134 (112 S. Ct. 2395, 2403, 120 L.Ed.2d 101 
       (1992) ("Listeners' reaction to speech is not a content- 
       neutral basis for regulation"). 
 
Id. at 2342-43 (citation omitted). 
 
Because the Township and the Board seek to justify the 
Board's resolution on the sole basis of a desire to protect 
minors from exposure to adult entertainment, Reno 
requires that we subject that resolution to strict scrutiny. 
Our conclusion would not be different, however, if we were 
persuaded that Renton supplies the appropriate test. While 
protecting minors from exposure to adult entertainment 
can accurately be characterized as a compelling and a 
substantial governmental interest, the regulation imposed 
by the Board's resolution is neither the least restrictive 
means of furthering that interest nor narrowly tailored to 
serve that interest. Accordingly, we conclude that the 
Board's resolution restricted protected speech in violation of 
U.S. Sound's right to free expression under the First 
Amendment. 
 When the Township and Board's regulation of protected 
speech was challenged, they bore the burden under both 
the strict and intermediate scrutiny tests of identifying the 
governmental interest or interests that motivated the 
Board's resolution and of coming forward with facts which 
would support a conclusion that the resolution was 
 




sufficiently narrowly drawn to serve that interest or those 
interests. Phillips, 107 F.3d at 172-73.2 They have failed to 
do so. 
 
There is no question that the Constitution allows the 
Township to foreclose display and distribution of adult 
materials to minors. Indeed, U.S. Sound acknowledges that 
the Township can promote its compelling state interest in 
protecting minors from exposure to adult entertainment by 
requiring U.S. Sound to market adult materials only in 
segregated space to which minors are denied access. But 
U.S. Sound objects to the additional burdens on its 
expressive activities. As U.S. Sound stresses, even under 
Renton, the Township may not regulate its expressive 
activities in such a way that "a substantial portion of the 
burden . . . does not serve to advance" the professed goal 
of preventing exposure of minors to adult entertainment. 
Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 799 (1989). 
 
While the Township and the Board have identified the 
governmental interest they purport to be serving, they 
cannot explain why, having denied minors access to the 
only area in which adult entertainment can be marketed, 
the risk of minors' exposure to adult material will be 
reduced by limiting that area to ten percent of the floor 
space of the facility. Nor can they explain why, having 
denied minors access to the only area in which adult 
entertainment can be marketed, the risk of minors' 
exposure to adult material will be reduced by eliminating 
private previewing booths from the segregated area, or, for 
that matter, from the space to which access is not 
restricted. It necessarily follows that the motion of the 
Township and the Board for summary judgment should 
have been denied and that U.S. Sound's motion for partial 
summary judgment should have been granted. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. The Township and the Board complain that U.S. Sound, prior to filing 
suit, never volunteered to segregate its adult materials. U.S. Sound 
disputes this, and the record does not resolve this controversy. 
Nonetheless, regardless of what U.S. Sound did or did not propose, the 
Board had an affirmative duty when undertaking to restrict protected 
speech to confine its restrictions within constitutional limits. 
 




Because the Township and the Board have sought to 
justify the entire burden of their regulations of protected 
speech on the sole basis that minors should not be exposed 
to adult entertainment, our holding is a very narrow one. 
We do not hold that a municipality may not regulate private 
viewing booths for adult entertainment where it perceives 
serious secondary effects from their use that can be 
ameliorated only by such regulation. See, e.g., Ben Rich 
Trading, Inc. v. City of Vineland, 1997 WL 567320, at *10- 
*11 (3d Cir. 1997); Mitchell v. Commission on Adult 
Entertainment Est., 10 F.3d 123, 133 (3d Cir. 1993). Nor do 
we hold that a municipality is powerless to limit the 
amount of adult entertainment marketed by a video store 
where it can prove that a store with a higher percentage of 
adult material will have serious secondary effects on the 
residential neighborhood that surrounds the store. Nor do 
we suggest that where a video store that will be patronized 
by minors elects to screen previews on a public screen, a 
municipality cannot prohibit public exhibition of previews 




The premises on which U.S. Sound wishes to conduct its 
video business are currently occupied by another 
proprietor, and the owner of those premises disputes that 
U.S. Sound has a right to possession. Indeed, the owner 
disputes whether U.S. Sound has had a right to possession 
at any point after the Board's resolution of March 13, 1996. 
Whether or not U.S. Sound has a right to present 
possession is, of course, highly relevant to whether there is 
a current need for injunctive relief. Moreover, the period 
during which it has had a right to such possession may be 
relevant in determining what, if any, damages are 
recoverable by U.S. Sound. It is clear, based on the 
summary judgment record, however, that U.S. Sound is at 
least entitled to a declaratory judgment that the Board's 
resolution of March 13, 1996 violated its rights under the 
First Amendment. Accordingly, we will reverse the judgment 
of the district court with instructions that it enter such a 
declaratory judgment and that it conduct such further 
 




proceedings consistent with this opinion as may be 
necessary. 
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